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Searhing good strategies in adaptive minority games
Marko Sysi-Aho, Anirban Chakraborti, and Kimmo Kaski
Laboratory of Computational Engineering,
Helsinki University of Tehnology,
P. O. Box 9203, FIN-02015 HUT, Finland.
In this paper we introdue adaptation mehanism based on geneti algorithms in minority games.
If agents nd their performanes too low, they modify their strategies in hope to improve their
performanes and beome more suessful. One aim of this study is to nd out what happens at the
system as well as at the individual agent level. We observe that adaptation remarkably tightens the
ompetition among the agents, and tries to pull the olletive system into a state where the aggregate
utility is the largest. We rst make a brief omparative study of the dierent adaptation mehanisms
and then present in more detail parametri studies. These dierent adaptation mehanisms broaden
the sope of the appliations of minority games to the study of omplex systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Various systems of natural and soietal origin show
omplex behaviour, whih an be attributed to ompe-
tition among interating agents for sare resoures and
their adaptation to ontinuously hanging environment
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5℄. Suh agents ould be diverse in form,
funtion and apability, for example, ells in an immune
system or rms in a nanial market, so that in the stud-
ies one should rst fous on the apabilities of individual
agents to understand better the nature of interations
between large number of agents. The behaviour of an
agent may be onsidered as a olletion of rules govern-
ing responses to stimuli. In order to model these om-
plex adaptive system, a major onern is the seletion
and representation of the stimuli and responses, through
whih the behaviour and strategies of the agents are de-
termined. In a model, the rules of ation serve as a diret
way to desribe the strategies of agents, and one studies
their behaviour by monitoring the eet of rules ating
sequentially. As mentioned above there is another key
proess to be inluded to the model, namely adaptation,
whih in biology serves as a mehanism by whih an or-
ganism tries to make itself t to hanging environment
but the timesale over whih the agents adapt vary from
system to system.
What makes these systems fasinatingly omplex, is
the fat that the environment of a partiular agent in-
ludes other adaptive agents, all of them ompeting with
eah others. Thus, a onsiderable amount of an agent's
eort goes in adaptation and reation to the other agents.
This feature is the main soure of interesting temporal
patterns and emergent behaviour these systems produe.
In fat this kind of adaptive systems are far more ompli-
ated than systems in whih agents just reat following
some xed rules of strategy and foresight for outome
as a onsequene of their behaviour. This latter ase
an be takled with the traditional game theory [6℄ sine
it studies onsistent patterns in behavioural equilibrium
that indue no further interations. In the adaptive ase,
however, further interations emerge during the evolu-
tion of the system, thus rendering the appliability of
the traditional game theory diult if not impossible.
In this paper, we will study a simple game model, in
whih agents adapt dynamially to be ompetitive and
perform better. In suh a model the strategies, whih an
agent uses to deide the ourse of ation, must be very
good or best for the agents to survive  similar to the
idea of survival of the ttest in biology. So just like
an organism adapts itself to its natural environment, we
propose that the agents of the game adapt themselves
by modifying their strategies from time to time, depend-
ing on their urrent performanes. For this purpose we
borrow the onept of geneti rossover from biology and
use it to modify the strategies of agents in the ourse
of the game, in the same way as in geneti algorithms
[7, 8, 9℄. More speially we apply this adaptation
sheme to the minority game, introdued by Challet and
Zhang [10, 11, 12, 13, 14℄. Although the behaviour of this
minority game is believed to expose a number of impor-
tant harateristis of omplex evolving systems, one of
its weaknesses is that agents have limited possibilities in
improving to their own performane whereas in real om-
petitive environment attempts to improve ones skills on-
tinuously are imperative. Our adaptation sheme [15, 16℄
proposes a natural and simple way to take this essen-
tial feature into aount, and its appliation turns out
to yield results quite dierent from earlier studies of the
basi minority game and its variants [10, 17, 18, 19℄.
This paper is organized suh that in the next setion
we briey introdue our minority game model together
with various adaptation mehanisms or strategy hanges
based on one-point geneti rossover. This is followed by
the results setion, where we rst ompare omprehen-
sive omputer simulation results of these strategies and
then fous on analysing results of the model of one-point
geneti rossover with osprings replaing parents, and of
hybridized one-point geneti rossover in whih the two
new strategies replae the two worst strategies. Finally
we draw onlusions.
2II. MODEL
Let us start by briey desribing the basi minority
game (BG) model of Challet and Zhang [10, 11℄. It on-
sists of an odd number of agents N who an perform only
two ations denoted here by 0 or 1, at a given time t. An
agent wins a round of game if it is one of the members
of the minority group. All the agents are assumed to
have aess to nite amount of global information, in
the form of a ommon bit-string memory of theM most
reent outomes of the game. With this there are 2M pos-
sible history bit-strings. Now, a strategy onsists of
two possible responses, whih in the binary sense are an
ation 0 or the opposite ation 1 to eah possible history
bit-strings. Thus, there are 22
M
possible strategies on-
stituting the whole strategy spae Ω, from whih eah
agent piks S strategies at random to form its own pool
Ωi, where i = 1, ..., N denotes an agent number. Eah
time the game is played, time t is inremented by unity
and one virtual point is assigned to the strategies that
have predited the orret outome and the best strategy
is the one whih has the highest virtual point sore. The
performane of an agent is measured by the number of
times the agent wins, and the strategy, whih the agent
used to win, gets a real point. The number of agents
whih hoose one partiular ation, hanges with time
and is denoted by xt.
In order to desribe the olletive behaviour of the
agents, we dene the onept of the saled utility as a
funtion of xt, in the following way:
U(xt) = [(1− θ(xt − xM ))xt + θ(xt − xM )(N − xt)]/xM ,
(1)
where xM = (N−1)/2 is the maximum number of agents
who an win, and
θ(xt − xM ) =
{
0 when xt ≤ xM
1 when xt > xM ,
is the Heaviside's unit step funtion. When xt = xM or
xt = xM +1, the saled utility of the system is maximum
Umax = 1, as the highest number of agents win. The
system is more eient when the deviations from the
maximum total utility Umax are small, or in other words,
the utuations in xt around the mean (N/2) beome
small.
At the level of individual agents, their performanes
in the basi minority game evolve suh that the agents
who begin to perform badly do not improve as the time
evolves and those who do well, ontinue doing so [10, 15℄.
This indiates that by hane well performing agents
were blessed with good strategies while badly perform-
ing agents got bad strategies. Although this is what may
happen in some real environments, there are other om-
petitive environments, in whih individual agents try to
adapt themselves to do better or to survive. However,
being good at one moment does not guarantee that one
would stay good later. In fat, there are many examples
in business, sports, et. whih show that those who have
deided to rest on their laurels have been superseded by
those who have deided to adapt and ght bak, and
do so persistently. This feature of dynami ompetition
needs to be inluded in the model, and it an be simply
realized by allowing agents to modify strategies in their
individual pools. How well an agent does then in real-
ity, depends on the agent's apabilities and skills, and
how the agent renes its strategies. For the adaptation
or strategy modiation sheme we have hosen geneti
algorithms [9℄, whih have turned out to be useful in vari-
ous optimisation problems. Within the framework of the
minority game this adaptation sheme is realised by let-
ting agents hek their performanes at time interval τ ,
and if an agent nds that it is among the worst perfoming
fration n (where 0 < n < 1), it modies its strategies
by applying geneti operands to its strategy pool [15, 16℄.
Here the quantity τ desribes a time sale that harater-
izes the adaptation rate of agents in the system. Hene
it an vary on a wide range for systems of natural origin
to systems of soietal nature.
In the geneti adaptation shemes we have used in this
study, an agent hooses two parents from its urrent
pool of strategies Ωi(t) ⊂ Ω, and draws a random num-
ber (uniformly distributed) to determine the rossover
point. Then the parts of the strategies, above and below
this point are interhanged to produe two new strate-
gies alled the osprings. In addition to this, there
are various hoises as for whih strategies are seleted as
the parents and also whih strategies are replaed by the
reprodued osprings. The mehanism whih works the
best depends on the irumstanes and an vary from sys-
tem to system. In some ases it is possible that saving the
parent strategies would threaten the suess of the new-
born strategies or reate too sti ompetition amongst
the strategies leading to possible disorder, and in other
ases the opposite might happen. In this study, we have
onsidered four dierent adaptation shemes of rst se-
leting from the strategy pool of an agent, the parent
strategies to perform geneti rossover for produing o-
springs, and then seleting the two old strategies that are
to be substituted by the ospring strategies:
(a) Two parent strategies from the agent's strategy pool
are drawn at random and after rossover these par-
ents are substituted with the two new strategies
(osprings). This proedure is alled One Point
Geneti (OPG) rossover mehanism with parents
killed.
(b) Two parent strategies from the agent's strategy pool
are drawn at random and after rossover the two
worst performing strategies in the strategy pool are
substituted with the two new strategies (osprings)
while the parent strategies are saved. This proe-
dure is alled One Point Geneti rossover meha-
nism with parents saved.
3() Two best strategies are hosen from the agent's
strategy pool as parents and after rossover these
parents are substituted with the two new strate-
gies (osprings). This proedure is alled the Hy-
bridized Geneti (HG) rossover mehanism with
parents killed.
(d) Two best strategies are drawn from the agent's strat-
egy pool as parents and after rossover the two
worst performing strategies in the strategy pool are
substituted with the two new strategies (osprings)
while the parent strategies are saved. This pro-
edure is alled the Hybridized Geneti rossover
mehanism with parents saved.
It should be noted, however, that there are a num-
ber of other adaptation possibilities, but the ones pre-
sented here ould be onsidered in a loose sense to bear
some resemblane with reality. From the point of view
of hoosing parents, shemes (a) and (b)  being ran-
dom  orrespond to demorati or equal opportunity
reprodution, while shemes () and (d) are elitist due
to searhing best parents and allowing reprodution be-
tween them. As for substitutions in the agents' strategy
pools, in the shemes (a) and () parents give spae for
their osprings to live and develop without the need to
ght for the limited resoures with their parents, a sari-
e for improving the survival of the speies. Examples
of parents dying after reprodution are numerous in na-
ture. On the other in deision making environments the
interpretation of killing the parent strategies is that old
strategies - unable to lead into suess - are removed to
give way to hopefully better strategies. Shemes (b) and
(d), with parents being saved and agents getting rid of
their worst strategies, bear some resemblane with nat-
ural seletion of the ttest surviving speies. In deision
making situations these shemes orrespond to agents
eradiating their loosing strategies. Thus it is expeted
that shemes (b) and (d) lead to tightening ompetition
between agents. Furthermore, it ould be expeted that
the sheme (d) is the most eient one, beause it re-
moves the worst strategies and replaes them with the
rossovers of the best ones, while saving the so far best
two strategies in the game. In order to study the eets
of sti ompetition between agents with ontinuously im-
proving strategies, in more detail, large sale simulations
are needed. In these simulations it turns out that when
agents use geneti operands, the saled utility of the sys-
tem inreases and tends to maximise with dierent rates
depending on the mehanism and the parameters of the
game.
It should be noted that our mehanisms of evolution
based on the geneti algorithms are onsiderably dierent
from the mehanisms applied before within the frame-
work of the minority games [10, 17, 18, 19℄. Here, the
strategies are hanged by the agents themselves and they
belong to the same strategy spae Ω whose size and di-
mension do not hange.
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Figure 1: Plots of xt (the number of agents making a par-
tiular ation) as a funtion of time, for the four adaptation
mehanisms (a)-(d), mentioned in the text.
III. RESULTS
A. Comparison between adaptation mehanisms
In order to ompare the above disussed four geneti
adaptation mehanisms, we have rst studied the quan-
tity xt, whih desribes the number of agents taking a
partiular ation, of the two possible ones, as a fun-
tion of time. The results for N = 801 agents with M = 6
memories, S = 16 strategies, and adaptation time τ = 40
for the worst performing fration n = 0.4 of the agents,
are depited in Fig. 1. First in Fig. 1(a) we present
the results of the adaptation sheme (a), i.e. One Point
Geneti rossover between two randomly hosen parent
strategies replaed then with the reprodued osprings.
In this ase it turned out that utuations in xt around
its mean (≈ 400) deay very rapidly from the initial level,
whih orresponds to the amount of utuations of the
basi minority game, to a more or less onstant level less
than half of the initial level. This renders our sheme
(a) game more eient than the basi minority game.
Seond in Fig. 1(b) we present the results of adaptation
sheme (b), i.e. One Point Geneti rossover between
two randomly hosen parent strategies with the repro-
dued osprings then replaing the two worst strategies
of the agent's pool. In this ase we observe that u-
tuations in xt around the mean deay, rst rapidly be-
low the value produed by sheme (a) and then slower
to very small values. Thus the eieny of the system
is further improved. Third in Fig. 1() we present the
results of the adaptation sheme (), i.e. Hybridized Ge-
neti rossover mehanism between the best two strate-
gies as parents, replaed after rossover with their o-
springs. In this ase utuations in xt around the mean
one again deay rapidly then seemingly stabilizing to
a level whih is smaller than for adaptation sheme (a)
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Figure 2: The saled utility U in panel (a) and (1−U) in log-
log sale in panel (b), for the four adaptation mehanisms as
funtions of saled time (one unit of saled time orresponding
to a time average over a bin of 50 simulation time steps). Eah
urve is an ensemble average over 100 runs. In eah panel, the
magenta urve represents the basi minority game, the blue
line represents adaptation mahanism (a), green line (b), red
line (), and yan line (d).
but larger than for adaptation sheme (b). Fourth in
Fig. 1(d) we present the results of adaptation sheme
(d), i.e. Hybridized Geneti rossover mehanism be-
tween the best two strategies as parents and then the
reprodued osprings replaing the two worst strategies
of the agent's pool. In this ase we see that utuations
in xt die o very rapidly, thus making the system most
eient.
Next we fous our attention to the saled utility U(xt),
dened in Eq. 1, whih is expeted to give insight not
only to the eieny of the basi minority game and
games with dierent adaptation mehanisms, but also
their dynamial behaviour. Instead of the standard pra-
tie of studying the variation of σ2/N versus 2M/N ,
where |σ| stands for the dierene in the number of agents
between the majority and minority groups, we study
the funtion U . This is beause utuations in xt de-
ay strongly for adaptation mehanisms (b) and (d), in
the latter ase sometimes even disappearing ompletely.
In Fig. 2 we show the results of the saled utility U
as a funtion of the saled time for the four adaptation
mehanisms, with the same set of paramaters as before
(N = 801, M = 6, S = 16, τ = 40, and n = 0.4), suh
that panel (a) is presented in the linear sale and panel
(b) 1−U in the log-log sale to see dierenes better. We
nd that the saled utility rapidly saturates for the basi
minority game, at a value whih is onsiderably less than
the maximum that an be ahieved. On the other hand
it is learly seen that our four adaptation mehanisms
greatly enhane the utilities lose to the maximum. The
value at whih U saturates depends on the mehanism
of adaptation and also on the parameters. In Fig. 1 it
was observed that the eienies of mehanisms (b) and
(d) are ontinually improving over time. This is learly
reeted in Fig. 2, where in the left panel the saled utili-
ties for mehanisms (b) and (d) approah asymptotially
unity, and in the right panel the quantity 1−U reveals the
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Figure 3: Evolution of the average Hamming distane of the
agents as a funtion of the number of geneti operations (one
geneti operation takes plae after every τ time steps) for
dierent adaptation mehanisms and parameters. The sim-
ulation was done with N = 801, τ = 80, n = 0.4 and ve
dierent sets of memories M and strategies S. Eah point is
an ensemble average over 20 runs. The dashed lines represent
the results for adaptation sheme (b) and the solid line for
adaptation sheme (d). The bold dashed line is for average
Hamming distane= 0.5.
asymtoti behaviour for mehanism (d) to be the fastest.
Therefore, we an onlude that the adaptation meha-
nisms with parent strategies saved are worthwhile, and
best result is ahieved with the adaptation mehanism
(d), i.e. with the elitist sheme. Later we will investigate
in detail the parametri dependene of mehanism (d) in
omparison with the simplest adaptation mehanism (a).
In order to examine the evolution of strategies in the
agents' pools we use the Hamming distane, whih serves
as a measure how similar the strategies in the pools are.
The Hamming distane between two strategies is dened
as the ratio of the unommon bits to the total length
of the strategy, denoted by dH . The strategies are said
to be orrelated, if all the bits are pairwise the same,
i.e. dH = 0; antiorrelated, if all bits are opposite, i.e.
dH = 1, and they are unorrelated when exatly one
half of the bits dier, i.e. dH = 0.5.
Let us now onsider the average Hamming distane,
whih for the whole strategy spae is alulated by rst
taking the average of the Hamming distanes over all pos-
sible strategy pairs in the agent's pool, and then taking
the average over all the agents. While it is obvious that
individual Hamming distanes between pairs of strategies
an hange as a result of geneti rossovers, the situation
is more omplex for the overall average Hamming dis-
tane. As a matter of fat in the adaptation shemes in
whih the parent strategies after rossover are replaed
by their osprings (i.e. shemes (a) and ()), all the
bits in the agent's strategy pool and for that matter in
the whole strategy spae remain the same and thus no
5hange in the average Hamming distane an take plae.
So this measure is useful only for the games where the
bits in a strategy pool an hange over time, i.e. adap-
tation shemes (b) and (d) depited in Fig. 3. Here
it is seen that as the game evolves, the average Ham-
ming distane dereases in both ases towards small val-
ues, but for sheme (b) game this happens onsiderably
slower than for the sheme (d) game. In the latter ase
dH reahes very small values, indiating that eah agent
tends to end up using a partiular strategy in its pool
for best performane. In the ase of sheme (b) the same
tendeny exists but one would have to wait at least an
oder of magnitude longer to ahieve the same level of sin-
gularity among strategies. On the other hand the plots of
xt (i.e. the number of agents hoosing a partiular ation,
depited in Fig. 1) shows that these strategies are suh
that the total utility, and thus the eieny of the system
tends to maximize. In Fig. 3 we have depited results of
varying the memory size M and the number of strategies
S in eah agent's pool. We an observe that in the ase
of adaptation mehanism (b) inreasingM while keeping
S = 10 xed makes the deay in the average Hamming
distane faster, yielding M = 8 ase the fastest deaying,
overall for adaptation sheme (b). On the other hand,
inreasing S and keeping M = 6 xed does not seem to
yield systemati behaviour, while S = 10 ase seems to
give rise to the fastest deay in the average Hamming
distane. In the ase of adaptation mehanism (d) the
situation is even less systemati, sine inreasing M and
keeping S = 10 xed yields M = 6 ase the fastest de-
aying, overall for adaptation sheme (d), and inreasing
S and keeping M = 6 yields S = 50 ase the fastest
deaying.
Next we study a test situation to investigate whether
the geneti operations an inrease the performane (i.e.
the number of times an agent wins) of individual agents
in an environment where few agents are allowed to mod-
ify their strategies while the others ontinue using the
predetermined set of initial strategies playing the basi
minority game. At the beginning all the agents play
the basi minority game and after t = 3120 simulation
time steps three of the agents begin to adapt using hy-
bridized geneti rossover with parents saved (adaptation
sheme (d)) and another three agents using one point
geneti rossover with parents killed mehanisms (adap-
tation sheme (a)). All the other agents ontinue play-
ing the basi minority game. It turns out that adap-
tive agents, although some of them were the worst agent
at the beginning, outperform all the other agents. Fur-
thermore, we observe that all the agents who use the
hybridized geneti rossover mehanism perform better
than those using the one point geneti rossover meha-
nism. Nevertheless, the ompetition in these three agent
groups is severe, as learly seen in Fig. 4. The suess
rate, the slope of the performane urve, is learly dier-
ent between adaptive and other agents; the best agents
in the basi game stay far below the adaptive ones. The
urves are saled suh that the average performane of
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Figure 4: Performanes of seleted agents as a funtion of
time for a game with multiple type agents. The performanes
in the gure are saled suh that the mean performane of
all the agents is zero. At t = 3120, six agents begin to mod-
ify their strategies suh that three of them used hybridized
geneti rossover mehanism with parents saved (sheme (d))
and the other three used one point geneti rossover with par-
ents are killed (sheme (a)). All the rest of the agents (only
the performanes of four agents are shown) played the basi
minority game without adapting. The best, the worst and
two randomly hosen agents from those who do not adapt
are plotted. Simulations were done with N = 801, M = 8,
S = 16, n = 0.3 and τ = 80.
all the agents stays zero. Furthermore it is seen in this
gure that the adaptive agents stay initially in the neigh-
bourhood of the average performane, but rossovers lead
them quikly to suess.
B. Parametri studies
Let us now move on to analyse the dependene of
our adaptive games on the model parameters: memory
size M , number of strategies in the pool S, rossover
time τ , and fration of worst performing agents n. Here
we will onentrate mainly on two dierent adaptation
mehanisms: one-point geneti rossover with osprings
replaing parents (sheme (a)), and hybridized geneti
rossover with the osprings replaing the two worst
strategies in the agent's pool (sheme (d)).
In Fig. 5 we present the results of hanging the
rossover time τ and the fration n of the worst per-
forming agents. The series of plots in Fig. 5 illustrates
the eet of hanging the rossover time τ and the value
of the fration n of the worst performing agents. In this
ase the strategies have been modied using one point
geneti rossover mehanism where osprings replae the
parents. In panel (a) of this gure we have plotted the
total utility U for ve dierent values of τ , while the
other parameters were kept xed, and in panel (b) we
have plotted the same data for quantity 1−U in the log-
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Figure 5: (a) Saled utility U vs. saled time when the
rossover time τ is varied and the fration of the worst per-
forming agents was kept at n = 0.3, (b) the same for the
quantity 1 − U in the log-log sale, () U vs. saled time
when the fration n of the worst performing agents is var-
ied the rossover time kept at τ = 10, and (d) the same for
the quantity 1 − U in the log-log sale, using the adaptation
sheme (a) i.e. one-point geneti rossover with parents killed,
and for N = 1001, M = 5, S = 10. Eah unit of saled time
is a time average of bins of 50 time-steps and eah urve is an
ensemble average over 50 runs.
log sale, sine from this panel it is easier to ompare the
eienies at the end of the simulation. In panels ()
and (d), we have varied the fration n from 0.2 to 0.6 in
inrements of 0.1 units, while the rest of the parameters
are kept xed and same as in panels (a) and (b). We nd
in panel (a) that as τ inreases it takes longer time for
U to saturate and the eieny dereases. On the other
panel (), hanging n does not have signiant eet on
the behaviour of the saled utility.
In order to investigate the dependeny of the utility
quantity 1−U on the memory and on the rossover time,
we have arried out extensive simulations for dierent M
and τ values, depited in Fig. 6. In this ase the mem-
ory is inreased from M = 5 in panel (a) to M = 8 in
panel (d). We observe that the deay rate between dif-
ferent adaptation times remain quite the same, and there
exists a threshold after whih the deay slows down. It
is interesting to note that longer adaptation times lead
to higher eieny as the memory size inreases. This is
due to the fat that for higher dimensional strategy spae
it takes longer time until suiently many histories are
gone through to verify the suess of a partiular strat-
egy. On the other hand if we do not allow this adaptation
to happen, strategies are hanged too often and even the
good ones are likely to be disregarded. Inspired by this
observation we have studied also the eet of adaptation
time to the nal utility value whih depends on the sim-
ulation time as we will disuss later.
In Fig. 7 we have studied the eet of hanging the
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Figure 6: Plots of 1 − U against saled time in log-log sale
for dierent values of τ , and M : (a) M = 5, (b) M = 6,
() M = 7, (d) M = 8, for the adaptation sheme (d), and
with parameters N = 1001, S = 10, n = 0.3. Eah urve is
an average over 50 runs. Eah unit of saled time is a time
average over a bin of 50 time-steps.
memory size M and the number of strategies S on the
quantity 1 − U . In panel (a) as M inreases we rst
observe an inrease in eieny, but then it starts to
derease with further inrease in M . In panel (b) as S
inreases the eieny dereases. The deay rate remains
almost the same for all S values as an be seen from the
slopes of the urves.
Next we study what is the eet of hanging memory
to the saled utility as the worst fration is varied from
n = 0.2 to n = 0.6 and other parameters remain xed.
Results an be seen in Fig. 8, from whih we nd that
the saled utility inreases as n inreases for moderate
M values, i.e. from 4 in panel (a) to 6 in panel (). This
behaviour hanges for higher M values, and shows that
the system an reah a more eient state, if the fration
of adaptive agents at any time is not too high.
As stated before, we have found that the total utility,
at the end of the game, varies with dierent rossover
times, while other parameters were kept xed. Espe-
ially, larger memory values inrease the dimension of
the strategy spae and require longer adaptation times.
In order to study this dependeny in more detail we have
simulated the hybridized geneti rossover with parents
saved mehanism (i.e. sheme (d)) for several M val-
ues and dierent values of total simulation time T . Re-
sults are illustrated in Fig. 9. The minima in the urves
are found dependent on the simulation time, as an be
seen by the slight dierenes between the urves for same
value of M but dierent values of T . If the simulation
times were unrestrited there would not exist an inrease
in the urves as adaptation time inreases. The longer
the agent an observe its strategies the more ertain it
an be of their mutual performane. If the adaptation
time is redued too muh, rossovers take plae more at
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Figure 7: Plots of 1 − U vs. saled time in log-log sale for
(a) dierent values of M , and (b) dierent values of S,for
the adaptation sheme (d), and with parameters N = 1001,
M = 5, τ = 40, n = 0.3. Eah urve is an average over 50
runs, and the unit of saled time is a time average over a bin
of 50 time-steps.
random. Thus it ould be envisaged these urves to give
guidane for a preferable adaptation time. Intuitively,
one ould guess that a good adaptation time would be
lose to 2M , beause if the ourrene of a history were
uniformly distributed, this would onstitute the expeta-
tion time for an agent to go through all the histories one
and thus see how suessful a response determined by a
strategy has been in eah ase.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In this paper we have applied various adaptation meh-
anisms based on geneti algorithms within the framework
of the minority game and found signiant hanges in
the olletive and individual behaviour of the agents. We
found that the hybridized geneti rossover mehanism in
whih the best strategies are hosen as parents and their
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Figure 8: Plots of 1 − U vs. saled time in log-log sale
for dierent n and M , for the adaptation sheme (d). The
parameters used in the simulation are N = 1001, S = 10 and
τ = 80. Eah urve is an average over 50 runs, and the unit
of saled time is a time average over a bin of 50 time-steps.
osprings replae the two worst strategies in the agent's
pool leads the system fast towards a state where the
saled utility tends to its maximum. This mehanisms is
learly better than those where the parent strategies are
hosen randomly and those where parents are replaed
by their osprings. The pre-eminene of the hybridized
mehanism an be seen on the system as well as on the
agent level: utuations in xt smooth down quikly and
the agents outperform those using other mehanisms par-
tiipating the same game. The suess of geneti algo-
rithm based adaptation mehanisms in minority games is
interesting and suggests its use also in other game theo-
reti optimization problems. It should be noted, that the
minority game deviates from the traditional optimiza-
tion problems beause it does not inlude a partiular
objet funtion or funtions that are tried to be max-
imized. This makes our nding even more interesting,
exposing a ertain harateristi of the minority game: if
agents have the possibility to adapt trough the responses
to the stimuli, they drive towards a state where their
own performane improves and the olletive of all par-
tiipants gain maximum amount of utility every time the
game is played. This property is not trivial to under-
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Figure 9: Plot of 1−U as a funtion of the adaptation time τ .
Eah point is alulated using the time average of the saled
utility from the last 500 time-steps of the simulation for dif-
ferent memories M and dierent simulation times (indiated
by T ). Curves are ensemble averages over 70 runs.
stand but it bases on the onvergene of strategies in the
strategy spae towards, in a way, the optimal ones. They
are optimal just in the sense that they tend to bring the
maximum utility for the olletive, meaning that at eah
time step the number of agents who win is as large as
possible: the number of satised individuals is at maxi-
mum. Adaptation mehanism further extends the lass
of phenomena, minority games are roughly able to de-
sribe. This is beause the basi minority game laks
an eient learning mehanism, but still the number of
systems where individuals try to improve their perfor-
manes in ompetitive environments is huge. Our way
to inlude adaptation is not arbitrary but has analogies
with reality and is based on learning and ombination of
dierent adaptation shemes, a way that is very simple
and ommon in nature and soial systems.
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